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STATEMENT OF FACT^
Dennis Jacobsen is a general contractor engaged in the
construction of residential and small commercial buildings (R.
89-90).

He generally contracts out approximately 80% of a project

including the mechanical, electrical, framing, roofirg, sheetrock.
painting and carpentry to subcontractors.

The remaining 20%

consists of "the contractor's portion of the...job. plus all of the
...odds and ends - cleanup, sweeping the job, maybe
[the]...footings..." and "sometimes11 the carpentry work itself (R.
96) .
Towards the end of 1984, Jacobsen hired £ruce Ring as his

employee and paid him a hourly wage to do the carpentry work on his
projects (R. 66-67).

After about six months as his employee, Ring

began to subcontract "little jobs" for Jacobsen (R. 67-74).

In July

of 1985, Ring hired Mark Pugh (R. 55) to "expedite" the completion
of one of Jacobsen's projects (R. 68). That project consisted of a
"hot tub/greenhouse addition on a residential home in Summit Park"
(R. 68). While Ring had previously completed "a couple of little
jobs for" Jacobsen as a subcontractor, this project was the first
where Ring hired employees to assist him.

After completion of the

Summit Park project. Ring and Pugh began working on another one of
Jacobsen1s projects, a garage and addition to a residence in the
avenues district of Salt Lake City.

Pugh was injured on October 2,

1985, while working on the avenues project after having been
employed by Ring for approximately three months.
As to his subcontractor relationship with Jacobsen, Ring
testified to the following pertinent facts:
1.

Jacobsen had overall responsibility for the project (R. 76).

2.

Jacobsen had "total control" over Ring's work (R. 69) and

how things were going from day to day (R. 89).
3.

Jacobsen was Ring's "direct boss" (R. 68).

4.

Jacobsen visited the job site between two and five times per

week, sometimes staying all day (R. 69).
5.

When Jacobsen visited the job site it was to give "specific

instructions" and later to see that those instructions were being
carried out (R. 70).
6.

Jacobsen made changes in the way Ring was constructing the
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project "basically every time he came" to the site (R. 70-71).
7.

Jacobsen asked Ring to hire more employees to "speed up the

[avenues] job" which Ring did (R. 82-83).
8.

Jacobsen instructed Ring on which jihase of the carpentry

should be completed "next" (R. 84).
9.

Ring felt obligated to follow Jacobsen's suggestions (R. 84)

10.

Jacobsen gave Mark Pugh "suggestions" on how to do a piece

of carpentry (R. 92).
11.

Had Jacobsen not liked the job Pugh was doing and asked

Ring to fire him. Ring would have done so (R. 80).
12.

During the entire time Ring had "known or been associated

with Jacobsen", he did not work for any other general contractors
(R. 76-77).
13.

Jacobsen didn't give Ring any more instructions during the

time Ring was his hourly employee than when he was subcontracting
(R. 86).
14.

"A general contractor [Jacobsen] acquires a job by

submitting a bid.

He can then sub out certain aspects of that and

he is in charge of the entire job and everybody that comes on to
that job" (R. 68).
Jacobsen testified that he requested tha t Ring put in a full
day's work and that if Jacobsen told Ring to make changes in the
"specs" which required extra time, Jacobsen paid Ring by the hour
for those changes or completed them himself (R. 98, 100).
Throughout his testimony, Jacobsen never ind |Lcated t h a t he disagreed
with Ring's previous testimony regarding the i r working r e l a t i o n s h i p .
-3-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
No err was committed below in finding:
1.

That Mark Pugh was Dennis Jacobsen's statutory employee,

2.

That Bruce Ring and Jacobsen are jointly and severally

liable for Pugh's benefits.
3.

That the Uninsured Employers" Fund

is not liable as a

surety for Ring.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
PUGH TO BE THE STATUTORY EMPLOYEE OF JACOBSEN.
On September 30, 1986, the Supreme Court of Utah filed its
opinion in Case Number 20705, Robert N. Bennett v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, Johnson Brothers Construction and C. L. Matthews
Construction.

After reviewing the history of the statutory employee

provision in Section 35-1-42(2) (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) the Court
articulated guidelines for determining whether a statutory
employer/employee relationship exists.

The facts surrounding the

Jacobsen/Ring/Pugh relationship bring this case squarely within the
Bennett decision, which is thus controlling.
In Bennett, Johnson Brothers Construction subcontracted to
replace a concrete driveway on a remodeling project where C. L.
Matthews Construction was the general contractor.

Johnson Brothers

in turn "contacted11 Bennett and another individual and "asked them
1

The name of the Default Indemnity Fund was changed to the
Uninsured Employers' Fund in 1986. The Fund is referred to by its
new name in this brief.
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if they would like to do the job for a setjsum."
at p. 1)

(Bennett, supra,

Johnson Brothers characterized Bennett as an independent

contractor and the Industrial Commission agreed, thereby denying him
workers1 compensation benefits.

The Supreme Court disagreed with

the Commission and found that Bennett was in fact an employee of
defendant Johnson Brothers Construction.
The Supreme Court then addressed the islsue of whether or not
Bennett was a statutory employee of Matthews, the general
contractor.

Although the Court did not dec:ide the issue, instead

remanding the case to the Commission for deltermination, the Court
did analyze Section 35-1-42(2) and set fortn the following criteria
to be used in determining whether or not the statutory requirements
had been met:
Under Section 35-1-42(2), a subcontractor's
employee is deemed an employee of the general""
contractor if (1) the general contractor retains
some supervision or control over tlie
subcontractors work, and (2) the work done by
the subcontractor is a "part or process in the
trade or business of the employer.'^ [Emphasis in
original]
A subcontractor's work is "part or process in
the trade or business of the employjer," if it is
part of the operations which direct ly relate to
the successful performance of the g|eneral
contractor's commercial enterprise
The trade or
business of a general contractor in the
construction business is constructi on, and any
portion of the general contractor's construction
project which is subcontracted out will
ordinarily be considered "part or process in the
trade or business of" the general contractor.
[Emphasis supplied]
The requirement in Section 35-1-42(2) that the
general contractor, as a "statutory employer,"
retain "supervision or control" over the work of
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the subcontractor who hired the "statutory
employee" cannot, by definition, be equated with
the common law standard for determining whether a
person is an employee or an independent
contractor. In dealing with "statutory"
employees, the statute begins with the
proposition that the claimant qualifies as an
employee of the subcontractor. But the statutory
requirement that the general contractor have
"supervision or control" over the work of the
subcontractor cannot mean that the subcontractor
must also qualify as an employee of the general
contractor. That would be at least highly
improbable and perhaps impossible by definition.
Rather, the term "supervision or control"
requires only that the general contractor retain
ultimate control over the project. [Emphasis
supplied]
Although the construction process requires the
general contractor to delegate to a greater or
lesser degree to subcontractors, the general
contractor remains responsible for successful
completion of the entire project and of necessity
retains the right to require that subcontractors
perform according to specifications. The power
to supervise or control the ultimate performance
of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that
the general contractor retain supervision or
control over the subcontractor. Therefore, as
long as a subcontractor's work is a part or
process of the general contractor's business, an
inference arises that the general contractor has
retained supervision or control over the
subcontractor sufficient to meet the requirement
of Section 35-1-42(2).
Finally, we note that the remedial purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act supports the
conclusion that Section 35-1-42(2) should be
construed in favor of protecting the employee.
Ring was a carpenter providing the carpentry work on Jacobsen's
projects.

Jacobsen sometimes did the carpentry himself.

Jacobsen

remained responsible for the successful completion of the entire
project.

He also retained the right, and in fact exercised ultimate

supervision and control over Ring in seeing to it that he
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performed according to specifications.
Applying the Bennett criteria to the Jacobsen/Ring relationship,
it is clear that Pugh was Jacobsen1s statutory employee.

As to the

first requirement of the definition, supervision or control, there
is no evidence in the record below to contradict Ring's testimony
regarding Jacobsen*s role as general contracctor on the project in
question.

Jacobsen had overall responsibil:ity for the project and

"total control" over Ring's work on a day-tjo-day basis.

In fact,

Jacobsen exercised the same degree of control (through the giving of
instructions) over Ring as his subcontractor as he had exercised
when Ring was his hourly employee (R. 86). Although respondents
contend the Jacobsen/Ring relationship satisfies all of the
supervision and control standards enunciated in the earlier cases
cited by Jacobsen in his brief, those cases are irrelevant in light
of Bennett and there is therefore no need to exhaustively examine
those cases now.

The Jacobsen/Ring relationship clearly meets the

supervision or control standard enunciated i)n Bennett.
The second requirement of the statutory employee definition,
that Ring's work was "part or process in the| trade or business of"
Jacobsen, has also been met by the facts in this case.

Jacobsen's

trade or business, as a general contractor i n the construction
business, is construction.

A portion of the avenues project was the

carpentry which Jacobsen subcontracted put to Ring.

Thus Ring was

engaged in work which was "part or process i|i the trade or business
of" Jacobsen, the general contractor.
Jacobsen argues on appeal that carpentryIwas not "part or
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process" of the construction business because the carpentry work was
not "ordinarily accomplished with his own employees."
brief at p. 17)

(Appellant's

Jacobsen cites Lee v. Chevron Oil Company, Utah,

565 P.2d 1128 (1977), in support of this assertion.

In Lee, the

plaintiffs "were employed by Oaks Construction Company.

Oaks was

engaged on an hourly basis to clean storage tanks for [Chevron Oil
Company] defendant."

(Lee, supra, at p. 1129.)

In upholding the

trial court's decision that the plaintiffs were statutory employees
of Chevron, the Supreme Court did, in fact, use the language cited
in Jacobsen's brief.

However, the entire paragraph and the

accompanying footnote are essential to understand the Court's
meaning.
"In San Isabel Electric Association, Inc. v. Bramer the
court in discussing the 'statutory employer' statute stated
the legislative intent was to prevent employers from
evading compensation coverage by contracting out work
instead of directly hiring the workmen. Thus the statute
covers all situations in which the subcontracted work is
such a part of the constructive employer's regular business
operation as he would ordinarily accomplish with is own
employees. 10
10

...But, with a surprising degree of harmony, the
cases applying these assorted phrases agree upon the
general rule of thumb that the statute covers all
situations in which work is accomplished which this
employer, or employers in a similar business, would
ordinarily do through employees...." Also see Howard v.
Vulcan Materials Company, (5 Cir. 1974), 294 F.2d 1183,
1184, wherein the court stated that contracted work is a
part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation if
it is so necessary to its operation that save for the
contractor, it would have to hire workers of its own to
perform the task.
Citations omitted , Lee, supra, at p. 1131, [emphasis
supplied.]
When read in context, the Lee test is not, did Jacobsen

_a_

ordinarily hire his own employees to perfoxjm the carpentry work on a
project, but rather was the carpentry work Iso necessary to
Jacobsen's construction business that he "would have to hire workers
of his own to perform the task" save for subcontracting to Ring.

It

can't be argued that Jacobsen could construct a building without
carpentry work being performed.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOJT ERR IN FINDING
JACOBSEN ULTIMATELY LIABLE AND RELIEVING THE
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND OF LIABILITY
Jacobsen objects to the Commission's finding of joint and
several liability and argues, in Point II or his brief, that the
Commission should have found Ring primarily liable and Jacobsen
secondarily liable.

Since the Industrial Commission did in fact

conclude that Jacobsen would only be liable in the event of Ring's
default and then with full rights of subrogation against Ring, (R.
152-153) this point on appeal is merely a pijelude to the ultimate
issue as raised in Jacobsen's Point III.
Respondents agree with Jacobsen's argument that if the immediate
employer (Ring) had been covered by workers' compensation insurance
or able to pay the award, the statutory empl<oyer (Jacobsen) should
not be required to reimburse Ring or his carprier for a portion of
the award.

In that sense. Ring should be primarily liable and

Jacobsen secondarily liable as the Commissioh held below.

Jacobsen

incorrectly concludes however, that having made this distinction,
the Uninsured Employers' Fund stands in as the surety for Rina and
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pays Pugh's award.

Under this theory, advanced in Point III of

Jacobsen's brief, a statutory employer escapes liability
altogether.

In addressing that issue on Jacobsen's Motion for

Review, the Industrial Commission correctly held that
"If the legislature had wanted the [Uninsured Employers1
Fund] to take the place of 'statutory' employers, the
legislature would have repealed the 'statutory employer'
section of U. C. A. 35-1-42, when the [Uninsured Employers'
Fund] legislation was passed. As the legislature did not
do so, the Commission finds the [Uninsured Employers' Fund]
was not intended to replace statutory employers." (R. 169)
It is not on the mere failure on the part of the legislature to
repeal this provision that the analysis of this issue should rest.
The statutory employer provision serves functions apart from and
beyond that of a "deep pocket" for the protection of employees in
workers' compensation law.

While it is true under Jacobsen's

argument that employees would be compensated for their injuries, he
fails to address the ramifications of abandoning statutory liability
altogether.
A.
Statutory employers are uniquely situated to
insure compliance with the mandatory insurance
provision of Section 35-1-46.
The construction industry has perhaps the highest uninsured rate
in the nation and is one of the most difficult to police for
compliance with the mandatory insurance provisions of Section
35-1-46.

There is generally no physical location (like with

restaurants or manufacturing plants) but rather the job sites are
scattered throughout the state and move upon completion of each
-10-

project.

This makes it impossible to "clofee down" a construction

company pursuant to a cease and desist order.

The seasonal nature

of most construction companies complicate Enforcement.

Provided a

company can be identified as an uninsured entity and successfully
prosecuted, by the time a court order is in effect the company has
ceased operations for the winter.

If the general contractor

subcontracts a substantial portion of his Work, expensive and
exhaustive discovery and trial time would be necessary to establish
the actual working relationships between the contractor, his
subcontractors and their employees.

Obtain ing witnesses "against"

the subcontractors in an attempt to prove nbn-compliance has, in the
past, proven to be an impossible barrier to prosecution.

The

subcontractor invariably raises the defense that he has no
employees, only independent contractors, requiring that the employee
come to court and testify against the person who signs his check and
thereby provides his livelihood.

In practicality

it does not help

to say that the employee can be subpoenaed since the employee will
all too well understand that his testimony n|eans his job.
The Industrial Commissions greatest ally in this battle is the
general contractor.

Knowing that ultimate 1:iability will rest with

him, the general contractor "has it within hpis power" to choose
responsible subcontractors "and insist upon appropriate compensation
protection for their workers."

(1C A. Larson, Workmen1s

Compensation Law, Section 49.14 [1986], as cited with approval in
Bennett, supra, at p. 5.)

Without the help <bf the general

contractor who can require that his subcontractors obtain and
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maintain insurance, the Industrial Commission has a difficult if not
impossible task in discovering and prosecuting the subcontractors to
enforce compliance.
B.
The statutory employer provision prevents
evasion of compensation coverage by the
subcontracting of the employers' normal work.
The construction business is a high risk industry.

The very

nature of the work involves the potential for serious, debilitating
and costly injuries.

Because of that, workers' compensation

insurance premiums are considerably higher in this industry than in
most others.

This is also a business which lends itself to the

subcontracting of the majority of the high risk work involved.

If

the appellant prevails on this issue, there would be no statutory
employer liability.

Every general contractor would thus be

encouraged to get their employees off of their insurance policies by
calling them subcontractors or employees of their subcontractors.
By avoiding the premium payment, the general contractor could offer
a portion of that savings to the "subcontractor" thereby increasing
his wages, an offer most would not turn down.

In the event one of

his subcontractors was injured on the job, the general contractor,
under the independent contractor/employee test in Bennett, supra,
would in all likelihood be found liable for the subcontractor's
injuries.

The subcontractor would thus in a sense be "covered" for

any injury he sustained on the job and the general contractor would
insulate himself from liability for all injuries sustained by the
employees of the subcontractor.

A profitable arrangement for both
-12-

the general contractor and his subcontractors and a very expensive
one for the Uninsured Employers' Fund.

The Uninsured Employers1 Fund liacks the funding
necessary to underwrite the workers1 compensation
coverage for the entire construction industry,
i

Without the statutory employer provision as advocated by
appellant, this high risk industry, impossible to police and with a
I
disincentive to insure, would look to the Already inadequate
reserves of the Uninsured Employers' Fund fi<
or benefits.

Becoming

the insurer (or "surety" as appellant prefeirs to call it) for this
entire industry could not have been the intent of the legislature
when the Uninsured Employers' Fund was created.

Had the legislature

intended such a result, it would have provided more adequate funding
and reserves.
There are over twenty-five Uninsured Employers' Funds throughout
the country.
1.

Most are funded in one of four ways:

An annual pro rata assessment against each insured employer

equal to all of the expenses of the Uninsured Employers' Fund as
in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Nevada, North Dakota, Connecticut, Kansas
and others.
2.

A minimum 1% premium tax on all insujred employers as in

Arizona and Maryland for example.
3.

A $70,000 non-dependent death benefit with general state tax

revenues for all amounts needed above that benefit.

California

is the only state which uses general state tax revenue for the
funding of its Uninsured Employers' Fund4
4*

The non-dependent death benefit as tl^e sole source of
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funding as in Montana only.
As it was first enacted, the Uninsured Employers' Fund in Utah
fit into the last category above.

In 1985, an informal survey of

funding was conducted of similar funds in other states and Montana
was the only other fund identified as receiving all of its revenue
from the non-dependent death benefit.

Although Montana's

non-dependent death benefit is lower than Utah's, Montana declared
its fund insolvent in 1981, two years after its creation, and has
paid no benefits to employees since that date.

In response to these

findings, new funding legislation was introduced during the 1986
Utah Legislative Session as HB300.

As that Bill was originally

written. Section 31A-3-201(2)(a) would have been amended to provide
an ongoing 1% premium tax for the Uninsured Employers' Fund.

As

amended on the floor of the House of Representatives however, the
Fund will receive a 1/2% premium tax for only one year, July 1,
1986, to July 1, 1987.

It is anticipated that this will generate

income to the fund of approximately $450,000.00.

After July 1,

1987f the only funding source will again be the non-dependent death
benefit.

Thus, based on the experience of other states, it is

believed that the Uninsured Employers' Fund is presently
2
underfunded.
If the Uninsured Employers' Fund is allowed to
function as a safety net, providing benefits to employees where no
employer can be held liable, funds will be available for a longer

2

Estimates on the number of uninsured employers
high as 25%. This figure is based on the number of
versus the number of employers reporting wages paid
for unemployment tax purposes and a random analysis
listed in the Salt Lake City "Yellow Pages".
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in Utah run as
known insureds
to Job Service
of businesses

period of time, perhaps indefinitely with (adequate enforcement of
the mandatory insurance provisions of the code.

However, if the

Uninsured Employers1 Fund becomes the "insurer" for Ring and those
subcontractors who are similarly situated,| the present funding level
will be exhausted at a more rapid rate.
When compounded by the enforcement problems attenuate to the
abolition of the statutory employer provision and the disincentive
to general contractors to obtain insurance, the problem will
escalate to crisis proportions before the ijext construction season
is completed.

With the Uninsured Employers' Fund unable to pay

claims, the statutory employer may again be liable, but at what
expense to future claimants against the fund?

With its funds

exhausted by the construction industry, thel Uninsured Employers'
Fund, which is also charged with statewide enforcement of the
mandatory insurance provisions of the code, will have no resources
from which to pay the administrative costs associated with
enforcement.

No enforcement will triggfer less compliance.

compliance means more claims against the Fund.

Less

It is difficult to

imagine that this was the intent of the legislature.
D.
Jacobsen1s complaint that aj statuto ry
employer has a "double burd en 11 under the
funding structure is unftrue.
Jacobsen complains that under the funding structure of the
Uninsured Employers' Fund, a statutory employer has a "double
burden" by paying into the fund yet being forced to pay claims for
-15-

his statutory employees and thus getting no benefit.

A brief

examination of that funding structure proves this is not the case.
Section 31A-3-201(2)(a)(b) (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) imposes a
1/2% premium tax on insured employers.

Even had the tax been in

effect during the time period in question, i.e., October 2, 1985,
Jacobsen can not complain because he would not have paid the tax.
Neither Pugh nor Ring were covered under Jacobsen1s policy.
Statutory employees are by definition not covered under the general
contractors policy.

Therefore, since Jacobsen did not pay premiums

to cover Pugh, he likewise did not pay and would not pay a premium
tax under Section 31A-3-201(2)(a)(b).
Section 35-1-68(2)(a) is the non-dependent death benefit which
is a funding source for "special funds" throughout the country.

The

benefit in Utah provides that in the event an employee dies as a
result of an on-the-job injury and the employee leaves no
dependents, the employer is required to pay a set amount into the
Uninsured Employers1 Fund.
the Second Injury Fund.

Prior to 1984 this benefit was paid into

This benefit is less than 1/2 the maximum

benefit payable had the employee died leaving dependents.

In a

sense, it equals out a windfall to employers who would otherwise pay
nothing when an employee who had no dependents died as the result of
a job related injury.

Were it not for the non-dependent death

benefit, employers could cut their losses by unlawfully
discriminating against employees with dependents hiring instead
single, childless individuals.
Additionally, it is not only the insured employer who is
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required to pay this benefit.

Uninsured employees are also liable

to the Fund for the identical benefit in tlhe event of a
non-dependent death.

The law does not discriminate against insured

employers.
Finally, the insured employer benefits!from the existence of an
Uninsured Employers1 Fund.

Prior to the enactment of Section

35-1-107 (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) there was virtually no
enforcement of the mandatory insurance provisions of the law.

An

employees uninsured competitor could consistently underbid or
underprice the insured employer through evasion of the law.

The

likelihood of prosecution or even detectionj made evasion attractive
to the unscrupulous competitor.

The creation of the Uninsured

Employers* Fund provided funding to hire the staff necessary to
enforce compliance.

The sums paid by an insured employer to the

Uninsured Employers' Fund admittedly are used to pay the claims of
employees whose employers were not insured, but they are also used
to insure a fair marketplace in which the insured employer can
compete on an equal footing with all employe]rs.
Jacobsen seems to argue that no tax is f<air where a benefit is
conferred on an individual in an amount which is disproportionate to
that individual's contribution.

Every tax and every fund, including

general revenue funds, are designed to spread the "burden" of
desired services among those who benefit from the service and those
who are best able to pay for the services.

The present debate over

how to fund public education is but one example.
-17-

Childless

individuals, because they are not afforded exemptions, arguably pay
a higher share of educating children than do couples with many
children.

Taxing structures are not designed to provide absolute

equality in terms of amount paid and benefit received.
SUMMARY
Appellant failed to raise any issue of merit in his Writ of
Review.

The Industrial Commission's Order should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this

^7

^

day of December, 1986.

/

^

^

—

-

suzan Pixton
Attorney for Respondents
Uninsured Employers' Fund
The Industrial Commission of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF MAI1LING

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the

r

day of

December, 1986, I mailed, postage prepaid, (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief!to:
Robert J. Shaugnessy
Attorney at Law
543 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Phillip B. Shell
Attorney at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT
84107
James R. Black
BLACK & MOORE
261 East Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
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S e c t i o n 35-1-107 U.C.A.
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35-1-107. Default Indemnity Fund - (1) There
is created a Default Indemnity Fijind for the purpose
of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to,
workers' compensation benefits when an employer
becomes insolvent, appoints or | has appointed a
receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient
funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to
cover workers' compensation liabilities under this
chapter. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits,
the fund will be liable for all obligations of the
employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35.
(2) Funds for the Default Indemnity Fund are to
be provided pursuant to Subsectiori 35-1-68 (2) (a).
The state treasurer shall be the] custodian of the
Default Indemnity Fund and the |commission
shall
direct its distribution.
Reasonable costs of
administration may be paid from the fund.
The
attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff
to represent the Default Indemnity Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on
behalf of the fund.
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other
benefits paid or payable to an Employee or their
dependents from the Default Indemnity Fund, the
fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers,
and benefits of the employee or their dependents
against
the
employer
failing
to
make
the
compensation payments.
-" (4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent employer shall be
bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund.
The court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a priority equal to
that to which the claimant would have been entitled
in the absence of this section against the assets of
the insolvent employer. The expenses of the fund in
handling claims shall be accorded the same priority
as the liquidators expenses.
(5) The commission shall periodically file with
the receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the
insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements
of the covered claims paid by the ft^nd and estimates
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^of anticipated claims against the fund which shall
preserve the rights of the fund for claims against
'the assets of the insolvent employer.
[
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the Default Indemnity Fund
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment, the fund
has the same rights as allowed under Section 35-1-62.
(7)
The fund, subject to approval of the
Workers* Compensation Division of the
Industrial
Commission, shall discharge its obligations by
adjusting its own claims or contracting with an
adjusting
company,
risk
management
company,
insurance company, or other company that has
expertise and capabilities in adjusting and paying
workers* compensation claims.
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund,
the commission, upon rendering a decision with
respect to any claim from the Default Indemnity Fund
for compensation under this chapter, shall impose a
penalty against the employer of 15% of the total
award made in the claim and shall direct that the
additional penalty be paid into the fund. Awards
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter.
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial
Commission, and the state treasurer, with respect to
payment of any compensation benefits, expenses,
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against
the fund, is limited to the assets in the fund, and
they are not otherwise in any way liable for the
making of any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules
for the processing and payment of claims for compensation out of the fund.
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(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date oi
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in § 35-1-81, and further benefits in the
amounts; and to the persons as follows:
;
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the
date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers'
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured Employers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereafter
be paid into the Second Injury Fund* If the amount in the Uninsured
Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after reaching the
initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into either the
Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may be
required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or
due the deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a
dependency claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order
and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to
the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the
employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted
against the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is
filed within one year from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall become permanent and final. If no temporary order
has been issued and no claim for dependency has been filed within one
year from the date of death, the commission may issue a permanent
order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into
the Second Injury Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of
death of the deceased.
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(2) (a) Every admitted insurer writing workers' compensation insurance
in this state, including the Workers' Compensation fund of Utah under
Chapter 3, Title 35, shall pay to the state tax commission, on or before
March 31 in each year, a tax of between 3V4% and 3l/4%1of the total
premiums received by it from workers' compensation insurance in this
state during the preceding calendar year. The percentage of premium
applicable in any given year shall be determined by the Industrial
. Commission at least 90 days prior to the payment date, and any percentage of premium over ZlU% shall reflect the reasonable reserves
necessary to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided for in
§ 35-1-107 in an actuarially sound financial condition. This taxable
premium shall be reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb), but not as provided in Subsection (l)(c). The
State Tax Commission shall remit from the tax collected under this
subsection an amount equal to 3% of the premium to the Second Injury
Fund created under Subsection 35-1-68(1), XU% of the premium to the
General Fund, and any remaining applicable percentage of the premium to the Uninsured Employers' Fund created under § 35-1-107. No
tax that is to be transferred into the General Fund may be collected on
premiums received from Utah public agencies.
(b) Effective July 1, 1987, the variable tax provided in Subsection
(2)(a) shall be replaced by a flat tax of ZlU%.

This is a misprint in text. Should read "a tax of
between 3 1/4% and 3 3/4% of the total..." Additionally,
this provision is as amended. The prior provision, in
effect at time of accident, did not provide for any
premium tax payable to the Uninsured Employers' Fund or
the Default Indemnity Fund.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000966
*

MARK PUGH,
Applicant,
vs.
BRUCE RING (Uninsured);
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND; and
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 19,
1986, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Phillip
B. Shell, Attorney at Law.
The Defendant Bruce Ring was represented by Joseph C.
Foley, Attorney at Law.
The Defendants Dennis Jacobsen and/or State Insurance
Fund were represented by Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at
Law.
The Defendant Default Indemnicy Fund was represented
by Suzan Pixton, Administrator.

The principal issue in this case is whether the case is subject to
the provisions of Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. It is uncontroverted that the Applicant, Mark Pugh, was employed
as a laborer/carpenterfs helper by Bruce Ring at $5.50 an hour. His average
weekly wage is controverted, and there are no payroll records available that
would assist the Commission in a more precise determination of the Applicant's
weekly wage, but Mr. Ring certified that he paid the Applicant a total of
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$1,353.50 over a ten-week period. Because the Applicant started at $5.00 an
hour and was earning $5.50 an hour at the time or his injury, it is reasonable
to assume that he was averaging about thirty hoikrs a week. Consequently, the
Administrative Law Judge finds in the absence of more precise documentation
that the Applicants average weekly wage at the time of his injury was $165.00
a week.
2* The Applicant's industrial accident J is not controverted. He and
Mr. Ring were on ladders in the process of putting up a beam. He tried to
move the ladder a little bit to get in a better position, but the ladder
slipped, causing him to fall. Just as the Applicant was trying to get up
after his fall, Mr. Ring fell on him. The Applicant immediately experienced
numbness in his right arm and had pain in his neck*
3. The Applicant went to the Veterans Administration Hospital the
next morning, where his neck was x-rayed and he was informed that he needed
surgery* A cervical fusion was performed on October 7. The Applicant was off
work until January 1, 1986, when he obtained employment doing janitorial work.
4* The Applicant is currently working and has apparently had a good
result from his surgery* He indicates that his doctor believes it is still
too early to assign a permanent partial impairment rating
5* The evidence is clear^ that the Applicant was employed by
Bruce Ring, who was working as a subcontractor tip, a job for Dennis Jacobsen,
the general contractor. This was a residential Construction job involving an
addition to a house located on the avenues. Mr. Ring had submitted a bid on
this job in accordance with the blueprints and specifications and was the
successful low bidder. He had hired the Applicant to assist him in the completion of this project* It appears rather clear from the testimony given at
the. time of hearing that Mr* Ring had formerly been employed by Mr. Jacobsen
as an employee but in recent months had been working as a subcontractor on
various jobs obtained by Mr. Jacobsen.
6* It was Mr. Jacobsen*s practice to subcontract approximately
80 percent of the work involved in a given job that he took on as a general
contractor. Neither Mr. Ring nor Mr. Jacobsen are journeyman carpenters, but
both have worked a number of years learning tt^e construction trade on an
on-the-job basis. There is no evidence that Mr. Jacobsen was any more
proficient as a carpenter than Mr. Ring. In fact,| Mr* Jacobsen testified that
in his own opinion Mr. Ring if anything was more proficient than he was. It
is also clear from the record that Mr. Ring was working from blueprints and
specifications and that he had bid this job on a Contract basis. It is clear
that no employee-employer
relationship exists at this time between
Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Ring, and it is equally clekr that an employee-employer
relationship did exist between Mr. Ring and the Applicant. As an uninsured
employer, Mr. Ring is in no way freed from the responsibilities placed upon
him under the Workers' Compensation Act as an employer. He is personally
liable to the Applicant for the benefits provided under the Workers'
Compensation Act.
29
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Discussion
The primary issue presented to the Commission in this case is whether
or not the Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable with
Bruce Ring for the compensation due the Applicant under the provisions of
Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. This Section recognizes a responsibility on the part
of employers generally to provide protection to employees who may sustain
on-the-job injuries as a result of an industrial accident. The statute does
not change the legal relationship of employee-employer but does impose
statutory liability in certain cases where the
employer
him by a
control,
business

procures any work to be done wholly or in part for
contractor over whose work he retains supervision or
and such work is a part or process in the trade or
of the employer . . . . (Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.)

In this case, there is no doubt that the subcontract work being done by
Mr. Ring was part or process in the trade or business of Mr. Jacobsen as the
general contractor. The statute extends coverage to
all persons employed by him [the general contractor], and all
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors . . . .
(Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.)
The basic philosophy of the statutory employer statutes enacted in most states
is
to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate liability on the presumably
responsible principal contractor, who has it within his
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their
responsibility and insist upon appropriate compensation
protection for their workers.
(See Larson, Workmen * s
Compensation Law. Section 49.11 at 9-12 [1982].)
In the recent case of Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby, 678
P.2d 305 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval a statement made
by the Arizona Supreme Court that
[this section] is a legislatively created scheme by which
conceded non-employees are deliberately brought within the
coverage of the [Workmen's Compensation] Act.
In the Frisby case, the Court also quoted with approval the Arizona case of
Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d 944 (1968), in
which it stated:
The evidence is clear in the instant case that the respondent
construction company exercised that degree of control over
the job to be performed by the petitioner sufficient to bring
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petitioner within the meaning of Section 23-902, subsec. B.
They provided the material that he ^as to use; the job
superintendent together with the architect made inspections
of the job and there were consultations; but the final and
exclusive control of the job was vested in the job superintendent. The fact that petitioner was knowledgeable and
trusted in his field does not lessen! the ultimate control
over the job by the job superintendent*
There is no evidence that Jacobsen provided any material used by Ring
in this job, but in all other respects the foregoing case is analogous to the
instant case. Ring testified that he considered himself to be totally subject
to the control of Jacobsen in the completion of this project. This was not
because he looked to Jacobsen for expertise on how to do the job, but that the
ultimate job had to be performed to the satisfaction of the owner and the
architect and that there was almost daily input by Jacobsen in this regard and
in regard to the ultimate completion of the project.
7. In keeping with the perceived application of the Frisby case to
the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was
sufficient direction and control on the part of Jacobsen to render Ring and
his employees "statutory employees*' under the provisions of Section 35-1-42.
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that this decision might well be
inconsistent with the Court's decjsipn in the Graham case rendered just two
weeks prior to the Frisby decision; but because the Frisby decision is the
latter of the two, the Administrative Law Judge presumes that it reflects the
prevailing opinion of the Utah Supreme Court.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW;
The Applicant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits from the
Defendant Bruce Ring in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. The
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable for the payment of
these benefits as a statutory employer under the provisions of Section
35-1-42. If the Defendant Ring is unable to comply with the provisions of
this Order within ten days from the date hereof, the Defendant Jacobsen and/or
the State Insurance Fund will be liable for payment of the same with a right
of subrogation against the Defendant Ring for reimbursement. Any determination of permanent partial impairment should be deferred until the Applicant's
condition has been certified and a permanent partial impairment rating
solicited from his treating physician or provided as a result of some other
independent evaluation.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay Applicant
compensation at the rate of $165.00 per week for thirteen weeks or a total of
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$2,145.00 as compensation for temporary total disability resulting from the
Applicant's industrial accident of October 2, 1985, and interest at 8 percent
per annum in the sum of $73.92.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay all medical
expenses incurred as the result of this accident, said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
Said expenses pertain solely to medical expenses and do not include charges
for nursing home facilities which the Applicant was provided.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay to Phillip B.
Shell the sum of $429.00 as an interim attorney's fee for services rendered in
this proceeding, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a determination of the Applicant's
permanent partial impairment, if any, be deferred until his condition has
stabilized and a rating has.been provided.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the Defendant Bruce Ring
fails to comply with the provisions of this Order within ten days of the date
hereof, that all amounts payable by said Defendant shall be paid by the
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen and/or the State Insurance Fund with full rights of
subroga- tion against the Defendant Bruce Ring for reimbursement.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by thet Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
#6^
day of March, 1986.
ATTEST:

' Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

//
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000966

MARK PUGH,
Applicant,

vs.
BRUCE RING
(UNINSURED)
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND and
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On March 26, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order awarding the
Applicant in the above captioned case temporary total compensation* and medical
expenses. The Applicant suffered an on-the-job fall on October 2, 1983. At
the time of the fall, the Applicant was employed by the Defendant, Bruce Ring,
as a laborer/carpenter. The Applicant and Ring were performing work for the
Defendant/general contractor, Dennis Jacobsen, when the accident occurred. On
that date, Ring was not insured for workers' compensation and Jacobsen was
insured with the State Insurance Fund. The Administrative Law Judge found
that Ring and Jacobsen*s insurer, the State Insurance Fund, were jointly and
severally liable for the benefits awarded the Applicant. On April 21, 1986,
the Defendant/State Insurance Fund filed a Motion for Review contesting the
joint and several liability, and arguing that Ring was the employer and should
be held liable for the workers' compensation benefits. The State Insurance
Fund states that if Ring was uninsured at the date of accident and is now
insolvent, that the Default Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits awarded.
The Commission is of the opinion that the Administrative Law Judge correctly
awarded benefits as against Ring and the State Insurance Fund, and that the
Default Indemnity Fund is not liable to pay benefits in this matter.
In its Motion for Review, the State Insurance Fund argues that the
Administrative Law Judge incorrectly applied the "statutory employer" provision of U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts in this case. That provision reads as
follows:
"Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or
in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, and such work is a part or process
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in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor,
and persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under
him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors,
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section,
employees of such original employer.'*
The Administrative Law Judge found th^t Jacobsen retained supervision
or control over the work performed by Ring, and that Ring's work was a part or
process of Jacobsen*s trade or business. Therefore, per U. C. A. 35-1-42, the
Administrative Law Judge found that the Applicant was both an employee of Ring
and also an employee of Jacobsen, causing Ring]and Jacobsen to be jointly and
severally liable for the Applicant's benefits.

r.

The State Insurance Fund argues that the facts show that Jacobsen did
not retain supervision or control over Ring, and that Ring's carpentry work
was not a part or process of Jacobsen*s project management business. Regarding
the supervision and control, the State Insurance! Fund cites particular pages of
the hearing transcript for testimony which indicates Ring acted independently
and without the supervison or control of Jacobsen. The State Insurance Fund
notes Ring provided his own tools (p. 34), hired his own labor (p. 36), and
that Jacobsen gave no instructions to Ring with respect to the performance of
the carpentry and did no carpentry himself (p. 35 and 57). Also.noted was the
fact that Jacobsen did not direct Ring's starting or stopping time for work
(p. 50), and the fact that Ring was free to work other jobs (p. 35). The
State Insurance Fund concludes these facts show no control or supervision by
Jacobsen over Ring, and therefore, U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable and
Ring alone is responsible for the Applicant's benefits (as he alone was the
Applicant's employer). The State Insurance Funa also argues that Ring's carpentry is not a part or process of Jacobsen's project management business as
project management does not necessarily involve Carpentry.
The Commission has reviewed the hearing transcript, and finds that
the testimony cited by the State Insurance Fund does support a finding of
limited control on the part of Jacobsen. However, other testimony seems to
point towards more than just limited control.
There is testimony that
Jacobsen had some voice in how many employees Ring needed, and some voice in
whether or not those employed by Ring were performing up to standard (p. 39
and 41). Jacobsen himself conceded, and Ring and the Applicant also testified
to the fact that Jacobsen was at the job site where Ring and the Applicant
worked, two to five times a week, and that Jacobsen supervised and directed
changes while there. Jacobsen also conceded he occasionally spent the entire
day at the job (p. 28, 29, 30, and 52). Also, even though Ring may have been
free to work for other contractors, he, in fact I did not. These factors indicate the higher degree of control associated with an employment relationship.
Similarly, there is evidence that carpentry was, in fact, more often than not
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a part and process of Jacobsen's business. Jacobsen himself testified he did
not always contract out the carpentry and did some carpentry himself (p 55).
With the respect to the "part or process" issue, the Commission is
satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to show carpentry was a part or
process of Jacobsen's business. There has been no real argument or evidence
to the contrary. With respect to the control issue, it is clear that there is
evidence pointing to very little control as well as evidence of a higher
degree of control. Because of this, the Commission feels it is appropriate to
look at the case law cited by both the Administrative Law Judge and the State"
Insurance Fund. L. Jack Graham v. R. Thome Foundation and State Insurance
Fund, 6 75 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1984) is a case where the Supreme Court found
insufficient control or supervision to apply U. C. A. 35-1-42, and hold the
general contractor to be an employer. The Court looked at some of the same
factors as have been pointed out by the State Insurance Fund in the instant
case, such as the ownership of the tools by the subcontractor, the fact that
the subcontractor was free to contract elsewhere, and the fact the subcontractor worked his own schedule. However, two factors noted by the Court in
Graham demonstrate that that case involved much less control and supervison
than does the instant case. In Graham, the subcontractor worked^ for several
other contractors while he worked for Thorne, and during one month, actually
worked only three days for Thorne and worked the rest of the month for other
contractors. In the instant case, Ring worked for Jacobsen alone, full time.
Also, in the Graham case, the contractor knew very little about the work he
hired Graham to perform, therefore, he was not competent to supervise Grahamfs
work except in a very general way. Once again, this is not true in the instant
case, where Jacobsen knew carpentry, and therefore, could and did supervise
the work performed.
In the other case cited by the Administrative Law Judge and the State
Insurance Fund, Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby, 678 P. 2d
305 (Utah 1984), the Court found a minimal amount of control to be sufficient
for purposes of applying the "statutory employer" provisions of U. C. A.
35-1-42. Concern for meeting the deadline, and the resultant directions to
the subcontractor to hurry, is the only factor of control noted by the Court.
The Commission finds much more evidence of control in the instant case, and in
viewing the Court's interpretation of sufficient control in Frisby, finds
Jacobsen had sufficient control over Ring so as to invoke the "statutory
employer" provision of U. C. A. 35-1-42. Furthermore, the Court's decision in
Graham demonstrates that less control than is indicated in the instant case is
necessary before it can be found that U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable.
The Graham facts show not only no control by the Contractor, but also an inability to supervise because of unfamiliarity with the work the subcontractor
was performing. Those facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the
instant case, and so the Commission must conclude the instant case is an
appropriate case for application of the "statutory employer" provision of U.
C. A. 35-1-42.
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With respect to the State Insurance Fund's argument that the Default
Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits due the Applicant should Ring be
insolvent, the Commission feels that the existence of the Default Indemnity
Fund does not preclude application of U. C. A. 35-1-42. The Commission finds
that if the legislature had wanted the Default Indemnity Fund to take the
place of "statutory" employers, the legislature would have repealed the
"statutory employer" section of U. C. A. 35-1+42, when the Default Indemnity
Fund legislation was passed. As the legislature did not do so, the Commission
finds the Default Indemnity Fund was not intended to replace statutory
employers. In conclusion, the Commission finds that there is no DefaultIndemnity Fund liability in this matter, and that the Administrative Law Judge
correctly applied U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts of this case. Therefore, the
Defendants, Ring and the State Insurance Fuiid, are jointly and severally
liable for the benefits awarded to the Applicant in the Administrative Law
Judge1s March 26, 1986 Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant/State Insurance Fund's
April 21, 1986 Motion for Review is denied, and! *-V»P Administrative Law Judge's
March 26, 1986 Order is hereby affirmed.

Lenice^L
Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utjrtv, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, t h i s
jiay of June, 1986.
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